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EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE ILLINOIS CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT SYSTEM: WORTH THE COST?
Thomas P. Sullivan *
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been over five years since the Illinois Governor's Com-
mission on Capital Punishment made its eighty-five recommen-
dations on ways in which the state's capital punishment system
could be made more "just, fair and accurate,"1 and more than four
years since Governor George Ryan emptied death row of the 167
men and women awaiting execution.2 Later in 2003, the Illinois
General Assembly enacted, and the new governor signed, legisla-
tion3 that adopted several of the commission's key proposals and
established the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee.4
The committee is to report annually to the General Assembly and
the Governor about the efficacy of the legislation and related mat-
ters. 5
In the summer of 2004, I wrote about the chief reforms recom-
mended by the commission and those that were and were not ad-
* Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP; Chair, Illinois General Assembly Capital Punish-
ment Reform Committee (Present); Co-chair, Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital
Punishment (2000-02); United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois (1977-81);
LL.B., 1952, Loyola University School of Law. I thank my associate Joshua Rafsky and my
paralegals, Marin J. Mackowski and Christopher M. Tansey, for their assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/cc
p/ccp/reports/Commissionreport/complete-report.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMM'N].
2. See Jeff Flock, 'Blanket Commutation' Empties Illinois Death Row, CNN.COM, Jan.
13, 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/O1/ll/illinois.death.row; see also People ex rel.
Madigan v. Snyder, 804 N.E.2d 546, 554, 560 (Ill. 2004) (upholding the governor's exercise
of clemency powers).
3. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3929/99 (West Supp. 2006).
4. See id. 3929/2 (establishing the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee).
5. Id.
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dressed in the new legislation.6 Now that three years have
passed, a current report on the status of reforms of the Illinois
capital punishment system is in order.7
II. THE USES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ILLINOIS
It is helpful to look first at certain information about how the
death penalty system has operated in Illinois since Governor
Ryan commuted all the death sentences in January, 2003.8
A. Death Sentences Imposed-2003 to 2006
From January 2003 until December 31, 2006, ten murder cases
have been tried in Illinois in which the defendants were found
guilty and a death sentence imposed. Five were tried in Cook
County, which includes Chicago, and one each in the "downstate"
counties of Coles, Lee (change of venue from Stark), Livingston,
St. Clair (change of venue from Jefferson), and Will. The status of
these cases as of February 20, 2007 was as follows:
* Five have been affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. Two
certiorari petitions were denied by the United States Supreme
Court, and three certiorari petitions are anticipated.9
* Two are on direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court and
are not yet decided. 10
6. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Preventing Wrongful Convictions-A Current Report from
Illinois, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 605 (2004).
7. This article contains my personal, individual views and is not intended to express
the views of any other person or organization.
8. Illinois still has a moratorium on executions in effect, but there is no moratorium
on seeking and obtaining new death sentences. See Press Release, Illinois Government
News Network, Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will Appoint Com-
mission to Review Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000), available at http://
www.illinois.gov/pressreleases/showpressrelease.cfm?subjectID=3&recnum=359 (announc-
ing a moratorium on executions in Illinois).
9. See People v. Urdiales, No. 98996, 2007 WL 495282, at *56 (Ill. Feb. 16, 2007);
People v. Harris, No. 98942, 2007 WL 289507 at *27 (Ill. Feb. 1, 2007); People v. Suther-
land, 860 N.E.2d 178, 240 (Ill. 2006); People v. Thompson, 853 N.E.2d 378, 409 (Ill. 2006),
cert. denied, No. 06-7013, 2007 WL 559932 (Feb. 26, 2007); People v. Mertz, 842 N.E.2d
618, 671 (Ill. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 47 (2006).
10. People v. Bannister, No. 100983 (Ill.) (on file with author); People v. Runge,
No. 103529 (Ill.) (on file with author).
[Vol. 41:935
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
* Three are pending in trial courts on post-trial motions.'
The number of capital sentences has dropped significantly in Il-
linois. The ten death sentences in the four years 2003 through
2006 is the same number imposed in Illinois during 2000 alone.12
B. The Resolution of Capital-Certified Cases in 2006
During 2006, Illinois trial courts resolved cases involving sixty-
one defendants who were charged in sixty-six indictments for first
degree murder in which the State's Attorney had filed a certifi-
cate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416 that the state in-
tended to seek the death penalty.1 The results may be summa-
rized as follows:
14
* Three defendants received the death penalty.
* Four defendants were acquitted at trial of all charges. Four
other defendants were acquitted at trial of the first degree mur-
der charges, but found guilty of lesser, non-capital felonies.
* Six defendants pled guilty to non-capital felony offenses.
* The other forty-four defendants were convicted of first degree
murder at trial or by pleas of guilty, and sentenced to life impris-
onment or a term of years. In half of these cases, the prosecutor
withdrew the capital certification."i
C. Observations on the Numbers
There is sparse data from which to draw solid conclusions
about the effect that the reforms enacted by the Illinois General
Assembly have had on the state's capital punishment system.
However, the foregoing analysis raises concerns about the fre-
11. People v. Baez, No. 98911 (Ill., Cook County) (on file with author); People v.
Banks, (Ill., Cook County) (on file with author); People v. Nelson (Ill., Will County) (on file
with author).
12. See E-mail with attached data from Research Coordinator, Illinois Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty to author (Feb. 15, 2007, 17:03 CST) (on file with author).
13. Three defendants were charged in multiple indictments. Prosecutors have 120
days from arraignment to certify capital-eligible homicide cases for capital punishment
unless the trial judge extends the time for good cause shown. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 416(c).
14. All figures in this section are on file with the author.
15. In other cases, the capital certifications were not withdrawn, and the defendants
were found guilty of first degree murder but were found not eligible for capital punishment
or the death penalty was not imposed in the sentencing phase.
2007]
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quency with which capital certifications were filed by Illinois
prosecutors, which in turn implicates the standards they are us-
ing when deciding whether to seek the death penalty. Consider
the following:
* Less than five percent of the defendants were given the death
penalty in capital-certified cases.
* The defendants were acquitted of first degree murder charges
in eight cases, thus making them ineligible for the death penalty,
so that there were five more acquittals of first degree murder
than death sentences imposed.
e Ten defendants were convicted of lesser, non-death eligible
crimes, often with agreement of the prosecutor. Eight of these de-
fendants received sentences of ten to fifteen years.
These results raise several serious questions in mind: Why
were so many of these cases certified for capital punishment in
the first instance? What criteria were used by the state's attor-
neys in the decisionmaking process?16 What public policy was
served by spending money, time, energy, angst and emotion as a
result of certifying this large number of cases for capital punish-
ment, when death sentences were imposed against only three de-
fendants, who will engage in costly litigation in state and federal
courts for the next decade? If their death penalty judgments are
eventually affirmed, and executive clemency is denied,17 they will
not be executed until a decade or so after their crimes were com-
mitted.
It is not my intention to impugn the good faith or integrity of
our state's attorneys, but rather to question the wisdom of their
charging decisions.
16. At the beginning of 2007, there were capital certified cases pending against 151
defendants in Cook County, and against sixteen downstate. See ILLINOIS COALITION TO
ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, 2007 ANNuAL REPORT 35-37 (2007), available at
http://www.icadp.org/2007%20Annual%2OReport.pdf [hereinafter ICADP REPORT]; E-mail
from Executive Director, ICADP, to author (Apr. 9, 2007, 12:26 CST) (on file with author).
17. Under the Illinois Constitution, the governor has the power to commute sentences.
ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12.
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III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MAJOR
REFORMS PROPOSED BY THE ILLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
A. Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations of Arrested
Homicide Suspects
The Illinois General Assembly accepted the commission's rec-
ommendation that in potential capital cases, police questioning of
suspects who are in custody must be recorded electronically, from
the Miranda warnings to the end of the sessions, and that unre-
corded statements are presumed inadmissible.'" The statute con-
tains various exceptions. For example, the presumption would not
apply where the suspect refused to cooperate if recorded, or the
recording device failed to operate properly. "9 The state may over-
come the presumption of inadmissibility if it shows, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the statement was voluntarily given
and is reliable.2"
At the outset, many officers were skeptical, and some down-
right antagonistic, to the recording mandate. But as they gained
experience and realized how favorable the results are for law en-
forcement, they became comfortable with being recorded. Most Il-
linois detectives have now come to agree-as do many others
throughout the country-that electronic recordings are a powerful
investigative and prosecutorial tool and they enthusiastically en-
dorse the practice for a variety of reasons. For example, by re-
cording interviews beginning to end, they put an end to claims
that Miranda warnings were not given or were brushed aside,
that police employed inappropriate tactics or coercion, and that
the officers are misstating what the suspect said or did. Defense
lawyers confirm that recordings "keep the police honest" by pre-
venting rogue officers from using improper tactics or misstating
what occurred. They also have been used to convince prosecutors
not to indict by illustrating suspects' sincere, believable denials
and exculpatory explanations, and false accusations by alleged
accomplices.
18. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1 (West 2006); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/5-401.5 (West Supp. 2006); GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 24-28.
19. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1 (West 2006); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/5-401.5 (West Supp. 2006).
20. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1 (West 2006); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/5-401.5 (West Supp. 2006).
20071
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Like instant replays in sporting events, recordings of station-
house questioning sessions assure both suspects and police that
whatever took place will be accurately recorded and repeated and
will provide a reliable basis for prosecutors', judges', and juries'
decisions. These recordings have become so successful among law
enforcement officers in Illinois that some departments have be-
gun to record custodial interviews in felony investigations even
though they are not mandated by the statute, which applies only
to homicides.
There is a clear movement by law enforcement agencies
throughout the United States to adopt the practice of recording
custodial interrogations in felony investigations. A number of
states require recording custodial interviews of suspects in major
felony investigations, some by statute,21 and some as a result of
court rulings.22 In addition, my associates and I have identified
almost five hundred police and sheriff departments, located in
every state, that have voluntarily adopted the practice.2 3 Experi-
enced detectives and supervisors from each department have told
us of their enthusiastic support for the practice.24
21. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 5-116.01, .03 (Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §
2803-B(1)(K) (Supp. 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16 (West Supp. 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 972.115 (West 2007).
22. See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1161-62 (Alaska 1985); Commonwealth v.
DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533-34 (Mass. 2004); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587,
592 (Minn. 1994); see also N.J. CT. R. 3:17 (requiring officers to record interrogations for
certain crimes). Many other state reviewing courts have noted the benefits of recording
custodial interviews. See, e.g., People v. Raibon, 843 P.2d 46, 49 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992);
State v. James, 678 A.2d 1338, 1360 (Conn. 1996); Smith v. State, 548 So.2d 673, 673-74
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740, 745-46 (Haw. 1994); Stoker v.
State, 692 N.E.2d 1386, 1390 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Buzzell, 617 A.2d 1016, 1018
(Me. 1992); State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 772 (Tenn. 2001); State v. James, 858 P.2d
1012, 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Kilmer, 439 S.E.2d 881, 893 (W. Va. 1993); In re
Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 120-23 (Wis. 2005).
23. See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, DEPARTMENTS THAT CURRENTLY RECORD A MAJORITY OF
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS (2007), http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl-sl8News/RelatedDocu
mentsl47/2959fListofDepartments.pdf.
24. See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, Nw. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, (CTR. ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 6-17
(2004), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinicwrongful/documents/
SullivanReport.pdf; Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations:
Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1128-29 (2005); Thomas P. Sulli-
van, The Time Has Come for Law Enforcement Recordings of Custodial Interview, Start to
Finish, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 175, 175, 178 (2006); Thomas P. Sullivan, Federal Law
Enforcement Should Record Custodial Interrogations, FED. LAW., September 2006, at 44,
45.
[Vol. 41:935
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A cautionary note is in order. Although funds were provided by
the Illinois General Assembly for training and equipment, 25 a ma-
jor concern that Illinois law enforcement officials have expressed
relates to other unfunded costs, including those required for tran-
scribing electronic recordings into typewritten form and for stor-
age. Therefore, provisions for funds to pay for equipment, train-
ing of officers in best practices, soundproof rooms, transcription of
recordings, and storage of tapes and discs should accompany a
statutory requirement of recording. Whatever these costs may be,
far greater savings will result from conservation of officers' time
in testifying as to what occurred during unrecorded sessions,
prosecutors' time in defending pretrial motions to suppress,
judges' time in hearing and deciding such motions and related
appeals, trial time for all concerned owing to increased pleas of
guilty when confessions and damaging admissions are recorded,
and avoidance of the costs of defense and potential damage
awards in civil rights cases.26
One other area related to this topic is the advisability of stan-
dard jury instructions on the methods that police officers are and
are not permitted lawfully to use during custodial interrogations.
Some examples are: promises that in exchange for a confession
the suspect will be given psychiatric help27 or that the suspect
will obtain leniency in sentencing; 28 misrepresenting the evidence
that establishes or indicates the suspect is guilty;29 and using
profanity, "street talk," or threats of violence. These instructions
will afford assurances to law enforcement personnel that they
may continue to use interview techniques that courts have sanc-
tioned, while at the same time explaining the methods that may
not properly be used under the United States Constitution and
state law.
25. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3930/7.5 (West Supp. 2006); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 705/10.3 (West 2005).
26. See, e.g., Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How It Happened, What It
Promises, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 403-04 (2005).
27. See People v. Shaw, 536 N.E.2d 849, 850-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
28. See People v. Hartgraves, 202 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ill. 1964); People v. Pugh, 100 N.E.2d
909, 914 (Ill. 1951); People v. Johnson, 674 N.E.2d 844, 847-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). But see
People v. Heide, 135 N.E. 77, 79 (Ill. 1922); People v. Ruegger, 336 N.E.2d 50, 53 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1975).
29. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969); United States ex rel. Hall v. Dir.,
Dep't of Corr., 578 F.2d 194, 196 (7th Cir. 1978); People v. Melock, 599 N.E.2d 941, 953
(Ill. 1992); People v. Martin, 466 N.E.2d 228, 234-35 (Ill. 1984). But see People v. Stevens,
141 N.E.2d 33, 37 (Ill. 1957); People v. Payton, 462 N.E.2d 543, 545-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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B. The Eyewitness Identification Pilot Program
With the availability of DNA in many cases, there is ever-
growing evidence that flawed eyewitness identification proce-
dures have led to an alarming number of wrongful convictions.3"
This led the governor's commission to make a number of funda-
mental recommendations regarding eyewitness identification pro-
cedures involving lineups and photo spread procedures. 3' The Il-
linois General Assembly adopted the proposed requirement that
the administrator of the identification procedure give eyewit-
nesses instructions in advance that the suspect may not appear in
the array, that the witness is not obligated to make an identifica-
tion, and that the witness should not assume the administrator
knows which person is the suspect in the case.32 The legislation
also provides that all lineups shall be photographed or otherwise
recorded, that the photographs shall be disclosed to the defense,
and that all photographs of suspects shown to an eyewitness dur-
ing a photo spread shall be disclosed to the defense.33
With respect to procedures in conducting lineups and photo
spreads, the commission recommended that when practicable the
administrator be "blind," that is, "the person who conducts the
lineup or photospread [sic] should not be aware of which member
of the lineup or photo spread is the suspect."34 Unfortunately, the
legislature has not adopted this recommendation.
The commission also recommended that instead of the use of
customary simultaneous procedures-in which the administrator
30. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological
Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765, 787 (1995) ("Mis-
taken identification is the single largest factor contributing to false convictions."); see also
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 530 (2005) (noting that between 1900 and 1983 there were 136
known cases of eyewitness misidentification in the United States); Kevin Jon Heller, The
Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV. 241, 244 (2006)
("[S]tudies have shown that eyewitness identifications are mistaken more than 58% of the
time, whereas less than 1% of DNA matches turn out to be erroneous." (citation omitted)).
31. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 8-9, 31-40 (suggesting a problem with
eyewitness identification and outlining solutions in Recommendations 10-15).
32. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107A-5(b) (West 2006); see GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, su-
pra note 1, at 34 (suggesting in Recommendation 11 that an eye witness should be told
that he or she is not expected to make an identification).
33. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107A-5(a) (West 2006); see GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, su-
pra note 1, at 39-40 (suggesting in Recommendation 15 that police should videotape line-
up procedures when possible).
34. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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shows the witness all the persons in the lineup or all the photos
in the photo spread at the same time-"a sequential procedure
should be used, so that the eyewitness views only one lineup
member or photo at a time, and makes a decision ("that is the
perpetrator" or "that is not the perpetrator") regarding each per-
son before viewing another lineup member or photo.""5 This rec-
ommendation was qualified by a requirement that sequential
procedures be "double-blind," that is, neither the witness nor the
administrator know the identity of the suspected perpetrator.
Controlled studies conducted in lab settings have shown that this
system results in fewer mistaken identifications of fillers, that is,
persons known not to be the perpetrator.36 The explanation is
that when using the traditional simultaneous viewing methods,
witnesses tend to make relative judgments by selecting the per-
son or photo that most closely resembles the witness's memory of
the perpetrator. Whereas when viewing one-by-one, witnesses
tend to make individual judgments as to each person or photo be-
fore going to the next, which requires the witness to respond
based solely on the witness's memory as to each person shown,
thus minimizing the risk of selections being made on less rigorous
criteria.
Rather than adopting the commission's recommendation, the
General Assembly funded a comparative pilot program in three
police departments, conducted "consistent with objective scientific
research methodology," to assess the relative effectiveness of the
sequential procedure.37 Departments were selected for the test in
Chicago, Joliet, and Evanston. The report of the program,3" an-
35. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 34-37 (suggesting a sequential procedure in
Recommendation 12).
36. See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45, 63 (2006); Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in
Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 459, 460, 471 (2001) (giving an overview of the sequential method and
comparing its accuracy to simultaneous lineups). The same lab studies show that the se-
quential system resulted in fewer correct identifications of the known perpetrator (in con-
trolled settings the actual perpetrator is known), but this was believed to be offset by a
greater reduction in erroneous selections of fillers. See, e.g., Wells, supra, at 63.
37. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107A-10 (West 2006).
38. SHERI H. MECKLENBURG, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:
THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND IDENTIFICATION PRO-
CEDURES (2006), http://www.chicagopolice.org/IL%20Pilot%2OEyewitness%20ID.pdf [here-
inafter PILOT PROGRAM]; see also SHERI H. MECKLENBURG, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES add. (2006), http://www.chicagopolice.org/Addendum%20to
20071
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nounced in March 2006, came as a surprise to most experts in the
field, because it found that the double-blind sequential proce-
dures were not superior to, and in some instances were inferior
to, simultaneous procedures.39 In particular, the findings were
that (1) witnesses correctly selected police suspects in a signifi-
cantly greater number of cases when simultaneous rather than
sequential procedures were used, and (2) witnesses selected fill-
ers in a statistically greater number of instances when sequential
rather than simultaneous procedures were used. 40 These results
contradicted virtually all prior controlled studies, as well as anec-
dotal evidence from departments that have used sequential pro-
cedures for years but without comparison to a simultaneous con-
trol group.4'
Shortly after the report was issued, it was revealed that a sig-
nificant difference in procedures was employed during the pilot
program: in the sequential lineups and photo spreads, the admin-
istrator was required to be blind (unaware of the police suspects'
identity), whereas in the simultaneous procedures, the adminis-
trator was non-blind (aware of the police suspects' identity). Some
experts in the field of eyewitness procedures and design of com-
parative studies questioned the validity of the reported results,
reasoning that because of this discrepancy, which they said em-
bedded a design error into the program known as "confounding
variables," the procedures used were not parallel with respect to
the administrators' knowledge of suspects' identities. This dis-
crepancy created a risk that in the simultaneous procedures the
%20IP-Report.pdf [hereinafter ADDENDUM TO PILOT PROGRAM]; REPORT TO THE LEGIS-
LATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-
BLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES app. (2006), http://www.chicagopolice.org/Apndx%20
to%20IL%2OPilot%20on%20Eyewitness%201D.pdf [hereinafter APPENDIX TO PILOT
PROGRAM].
39. PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, at i-ii.
40. PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, at iv-v, 39-40, 45-46; APPENDIX TO PILOT
PROGRAM, supra note 38, at 10, tbl.3.a.
41. All police agencies in New Jersey have been using the double-blind sequential
method for eyewitness identifications for the past six years. The administrator of the pro-
gram has told me both police and prosecutors consider the program a success. Other agen-
cies that use the system have reported similar results. These agencies include the Denver
Police Department, departments in Santa Clara County, California, and Hennepin
County, Minnesota, which includes Minneapolis. The following jurisdictions have also im-
plemented the double-blind sequential method as standard procedure: Boston, Massachu-
setts; Northampton, Massachusetts; Madison, Wisconsin; Winston-Salem, North Carolina;
Ramsey County, Minnesota; and Virginia Beach, Virginia. INNOCENCE PROJECT, BENJA-
MIN N. CARDOZO SCH. OF LAW, YESHIVA UNIV., EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION REFORM 2
(2006), http://www.innocenceproject.org/content/165.php.
[Vol. 41:935
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non-blind administrator could, consciously or inadvertently, sig-
nal the identity of the police suspect to the eyewitness, thus
skewing the results in favor of the simultaneous method. 42
A second flaw in the pilot program was also discovered: the
administrators in two of the three departments in which almost
all of the procedures were conducted (Chicago and Joliet) used ei-
ther all sequential or all simultaneous procedures, rather than al-
ternating between the two on a randomly assigned basis-a
method customarily used to protect against administrator bias."3
These defects in the pilot program's methodology, the critics
said, were inconsistent with fundamental, objective scientific re-
search methodology." The designers of the study took the posi-
tion that it was appropriate when using the simultaneous proce-
dures to use non-blind administrators, and to allow the admin-
istrators to use one of the two methods, because that is how line-
ups and photo spreads are currently conducted in Illinois." The
critics rejoined that proper scientific research methodology never-
42. See OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., STATE OF WiS., RESPONSE TO CHICAGO REPORT ON
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 3 (2006), http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/
ILRptResponse.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN.]; James M. Doyle et al., The
Street, The Lab, The Courtroom, The Meeting Room, PUB. INT. L. REP., Summer 2006, at
13, 14; Timothy P. O'Toole, What's the Matter with Illinois? How an Opportunity Was
Squandered to Conduct an Important Study of Eyewitness Identification Procedures,
CHAMPION, Aug. 2006, at 18, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/01cle7698280d
20385256d0b00789923/03c451bfa648758485257 le300634d5l?OpenDocument; Lawrence
Sherman, "To Develop and Test:" The Inventive Difference Between Evaluation and Ex-
perimentation 14 (2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.nacdl.org/sl-
docs.nsf/freeform/eyeID_attachments/$FILE/Sherman.pdf, Nancy Steblay, Observations
on the Illinois Lineup Data 3 (May 3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/Steblay-Observations-on the-Illinois-Dat
a.pdf; Gary L. Wells, Gary L. Wells' Comments on the Mecklenburg Report (Apr. 24, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript) available at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/
IllinoisProjectWellsComments.pdf.
43. See Sherman, supra note 42, at 13 (noting that administrators in Chicago and
Joliet assigned procedures based on geographic area). See generally COLIN DYER,
BEGINNING RESEARCH IN PSYCHOLOGY 220 (1995).
44. See OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., supra note 42, at 4; O'Toole, supra note 42;
Sherman, supra note 42, at 12-13; Steblay, supra note 42, at 3, 6; Wells, supra note 42.
See generally DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 5-6, 14 (1963); DYER, supra note 43, at 223-39.
45. See ADDENDUM TO PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, at 2; Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Kris-
tin M. Finklea, In Response to the Illinois Pilot Program on Simultaneous v. Sequential
Lineups, PUB. INT. L. REP., Summer 2006, at 9, 28, available at http://psy.ucsd.edu/
-eebbesen/LoyolaPILR_final.htm; Roy S. Malpass, Notes on the Illinois Pilot Program on
Sequential Double-Blind Identification Procedures, PUB. INT. L. REP., Summer 2006, at 5,
5, available at http://eyewitness.utep.edu/Documents/Malpass06NotesonTheIllinoisPilot
Program.pdf.
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theless requires the use of parallel systems in order to yield a
valid comparison of the two systems, and that the use of non-
parallel, non-random procedures was not in accordance with
proper scientific methodology.46
In the pilot project report, the authors assert that no one has
ever shown an instance in which an administrator who knows the
suspect's identity has indicated his knowledge to the witness, and
none was shown to have occurred during this study.47 It is an un-
fortunate fact, however, that this is precisely what has occurred
in a number of highly publicized cases-leading to convictions of
persons who were eventually exonerated by indisputable proof of
their innocence, often after they served many years in jail, some
under the threat of death sentences.4"
In an earlier article in a professional journal, Professor Roy L.
Malpass (who served as an analyst to the pilot program), Steven
Penrod, and Gary Wells, among others, all well known research-
ers in the field of eyewitness identifications, published an au-
thoritative study of eyewitness errors and suggestions for improv-
ing accuracy.49 Their first recommendation was: "The person who
conducts the lineup or photospread [sic] should not be aware of
which member of the lineup or photospread [sic] is the suspect." 50
In the explanation for this proposal, they stated:
We need not assume that a lineup administrator's influence is con-
scious or deliberate in order to see the value of a double-blind rec-
ommendation. It is well established that people have natural pro-
46. See Gary L. Wells, An Important Note on Field Studies of Eyewitness Identifica-
tions from Lineups: Filler Identifications are "Conditional Proxy Measures" 4 (Jul. 7, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/
gwells/Filler identifications as conditional-proxy.measures.pdf.
47. The authors wrote: "There also has been some speculation that the police 'lead'
witnesses to suspect identifications, lowering the rate of filler identifications. There is no
evidence to support this theory." PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, at iv. "Researchers also
speculate that a low filler rate is due to police leading the witness in the direction of the
suspect. There is no scientific basis for this speculation." Id. at 45.
48. A recent example may be found in Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir.
2003), in which a jury returned a $15 million verdict for civil rights violations based on
evidence that two Chicago Police Department detectives instructed an eyewitness to a
murder to identify James Newsome, who was convicted and spent fifteen years in jail be-
fore he was exonerated and pardoned by the Illinois Governor. Id. at 302-03. See also Ken
Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row Justice Derailed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at 1.
49. See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations
for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 603 (1998) [hereinafter Proce-
dures].
50. Id. at 627.
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pensities to test a hypothesis in ways that tend to bias the evidence
toward confirming the hypothesis. The confirmation bias in human
reasoning and behavior is the seed that gives birth to the self-
fulfilling prophecy phenomenon in which a person's assumption that
a phenomenon will happen leads to behaviors that tend to make the
phenomenon happen. The simple use of procedures in which the per-
son collecting the evidence is unaware of the "correct" answer is an ef-
fective prevention for this powerful phenomenon. 51
Indeed, in the pilot project report the authors acknowledged
that "[tihe use of a blind administrator should increase public
confidence that the eyewitness identification is not the product of
suggestion by law enforcement," and "[t]he use of a blind admin-
istrator also should reduce claims of officer misconduct."52
It seems to me a truism that, to insure unbiased identifica-
tions, using an administrator who is unaware of the identity of
the suspect is safer and better than using an administrator who
knows the suspect's identity.
Prior to beginning the pilot program, the administrators were
given training, but independent observers did not oversee the
administrators' conduct as the program was carried out. As a re-
sult, there is no way to determine whether or not administrator
bias in simultaneous procedures did or did not creep in. However,
the Chicago Police Department opposed the governor's commis-
sion recommendation of use of the sequential, double-blind
method. Further, the reported lack of filler identifications during
use of the simultaneous method are out of kilter with prior stud-
ies and common experience. Thus, Professor Malpass reports that
out of 100 simultaneous procedures in Chicago and Evanston, not
a single eyewitness selected a filler.53 Using a different method of
analysis, Dr. Ebbe Ebbesen, the program's other analyst, reports
just one filler choice out of eighty-six simultaneous procedures.54
These results have given rise to concern about the fairness of
the simultaneous procedures. It must also be borne in mind that
if the administrators directed witnesses to the police suspects,
51. Id. at 627-28 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Ryann M. Haw &
Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness Identification
Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1110 (2004) (explaining "[e]xperimenter
[e]xpectancy [e]ffects").
52. PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, at 56-57.
53. APPENDIX TO PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, Exh. 17, at 10 tbl.3.a.
54. Id. Exh. 18, at 13 tbl.13.
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they acted consistently with what the police regarded as the cor-
rect result.55
Other findings have undermined the accuracy and reliability of
the results.
First, in the executive summary to the report, the authors
state: "Analysis also showed that the rates of suspect and filler
identifications did not vary according to age or cross-race,"56 but
based on the supporting data, this statement appears wrong. The
results reported in the appendix to the pilot program report show
that when witnesses and victims attempted to identify suspects
who were in a different racial group than their own, they were
less likely to identify the suspect as the culprit.57
Second, prior controlled studies, as well as common experience,
contradict the finding in the report that the data collected
"showed no difference between identification rates when injury or
violence occurred, nor any difference when a weapon was present
or absent, contrary to studies showing 'weapon focus."'58
Third, double-counting of correct selection of suspects may
have crept into the study. In Chicago, where the great majority of
the procedures took place, the state's attorney requires that if a
witness selects the police suspect from a photo spread, there must
be a live lineup conducted. Since the already selected suspect is
the only person in the lineup whose picture was in the photo
55. I have no basis for saying that any of the simultaneous administrators intention-
ally signaled or suggested suspects' identities. But I do concur with the caution voiced by
Professor Wells and his co-authors "that people have natural propensities to test a hy-
pothesis in ways that tend to bias the evidence toward confirming the hypothesis." Proce-
dures, supra note 49, at 627 (citations omitted).
56. PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, at vii.
57. See APPENDIX TO PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, Exh. 17, at 4. Table 5 of Exhibit
17, prepared by Professor Malpass, shows a combined rate of 43% of cross-racial suspect
identifications, versus 59% in same-race suspect identifications. See id., Exh. 17, at 12
tbl.5. See also id., Exh. 18, at 29-30 tbl.39. The authors of the Report acknowledge that
the claimed lack of a negative cross-racial effect "appears to conflict with the classroom
studies showing that cross-racial identifications are problematic." PILOT PROGRAM, supra
note 38, at vii.
58. PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, at viii. Cf Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-
Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 687 (2004) (describing the performance of eyewitnesses in stressful situations);
Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 413 (1992) (examining the "weapon focus effect"); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth
A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 282 (2003) (describing a wit-
ness's ability to recollect incidences when weapons are involved).
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spread, the witness is likely to select the suspect again, as would
be natural, and both identifications are recorded as suspect iden-
tifications in the program's statistics.
The results of this pilot program will not be the last word on
the subject. A number of police administrators, lawyers and law
professors throughout the country who are interested in and
knowledgeable about police identification procedures believe the
Illinois pilot program does not represent a fair comparison be-
tween the two methods and cannot be relied upon to draw valid
conclusions about their relative merits. They intend to conduct
other comparative studies using protocols calling for parallel dou-
ble-blind procedures applied on a randomly assigned basis, with
independent oversight of the administrative process and without
risk of double counting. They believe these studies will yield ac-
curate, reliable comparisons.59 It is my understanding that in the
meantime the use of the sequential double-blind system is on hold
in most Illinois police and sheriff departments.
C. Recommendations for Future Action and Study Regarding
Eyewitness Identifications
The authors of the pilot program report made a series of rec-
ommendations relating to eyewitness identification procedures
that, in my judgment, provide fertile ground for further action:
(1) Pattern jury instructions should be prepared relating to the
fallibility of eyewitnesses and the dangers inherent in the identi-
fication process."
(2) New methods should be considered to ensure accurately
capturing the responses of eyewitnesses.6'
59. For example, the National Institute for Justice of the United States Department of
Justice has undertaken to assist in a new, comprehensive comparison of the simultaneous
and sequential procedures (blind and non-blind simultaneous with blind and non-blind
sequential), using rigorous, accepted scientific techniques. A similar comparison of double-
blind sequential with double-blind simultaneous is planned by the Tucson, Arizona, Police
Department.
60. See PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, at 62; see also infra Part III.J.
61. See PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, at 62 (describing, in Recommendation 2, tech-
nological options that could be used in the identification process).
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(3) Extensive training of administrators and development of
uniform standards for the training should be undertaken.62
(4) Studies should be implemented as to how to "assess, inquire
and record witness certainty at the time of the identification. 6 3
(5) Consideration should be given to the advantages of using
blind administrators in all identification procedures whenever
feasible.64 As noted above, the authors of the report stated that:
[T]here still are perceived advantages to the use of a blind adminis-
trator. The use of a blind administrator should increase public confi-
dence that the eyewitness identification is not the product of sugges-
tion by law enforcement. The use of a blind administrator also
should reduce claims of officer misconduct, a fact not lost on the sur-
vey respondents who cited protection from lawsuits as a welcome ad-
vantage of the blind administrator. 65
(6) Consideration should be given to the need for caution and
training in the use of sketches in identification procedures.66
(7) Standards should be developed for report writing of identifi-
cation procedures, coupled with training on the procedures.67
(8) Study should be conducted on the factors that affect eyewit-
ness identifications, such as "the type of crime, the type of wit-
ness, cross-racial identifications, the degree of prior relationship
between the witness and the offender, the duration of [the] crime
and the conditions of the crime."6
(9) Improvements should be made to the methods used to select
fillers in both computer programs and live lineups.69
D. Training Law Enforcement Investigators
The advent of DNA testing has brought to light many (too
many in my view) cases in which innocent persons have been
62. See id. at 62-63.
63. Id. at 63.
64. See id.; see also GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 32-33 (suggesting in Rec-
ommendation 10 that police departments conduct blind lineups and photospreads).
65. PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 38, at 56-57 (referring to a post-program survey of
officers who participated in the pilot program).
66. See id. at 63.
67. See id. at 63-64.
68. Id. at 64.
69. See id.
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convicted for crimes they did not commit and for which they spent
years in jail, resulting in severe personal and family conse-
quences, while the actual criminals remained "on the street," able
to commit further crimes. A careful review of the records of cases
in which the wrong person has been convicted show a pattern of
causes, especially mistaken identifications by eyewitnesses, evi-
dence of confessions that were not actually made or later shown
to be untrue, and false testimony by so-called "jailhouse snitches."
Many of the cases involved law enforcement officers, usually de-
tectives, who while well-intentioned, became convinced they knew
the perpetrators and bent their efforts toward accumulating evi-
dence to prove guilt. They were under the influence of what soci-
ologists and psychologists call confirmation bias,7" also known as
tunnel vision. Most of us fall into this state of mind from time to
time. It is especially dangerous for those involved in criminal in-
vestigations, but it is also understandable. Through long experi-
ence in investigating crime, detectives can easily acquire confi-
dence in their feel for "whodunit." When they focus their
suspicions on the actual perpetrator and then obtain supporting
evidence that shows they are correct, they are applauded for their
intuitive instincts. However, havoc can result when they focus on
the wrong person, pursue only proof that can be said to establish
guilt, and brush aside or distort that which indicates innocence.
A related phenomenon I have observed is that the more horri-
ble the crime, the less evidence of guilt is needed to convict. These
are often the cases in which capital punishment is sought.
In Illinois, eighteen people have been exonerated since 1973,
after having been convicted and given the death penalty.7' If the
percentages are applied to the overall number of Illinois non-
capital felony cases, there are hundreds of innocent persons serv-
ing sentences in Illinois penitentiaries.
In order to avoid this state of affairs, the Illinois Governor's
Commission recommended in 2002 that police, prosecutors, and
trial judges receive training in the dangers of tunnel vision.72
This subject has been added to the annual refresher courses given
to both new police recruits and experienced officers. This training
70. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
71. Death Penalty Information Center, Exonerations by State (Feb. 7, 2007), http:l
www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgarticle.php?did=4128&scid=6#inn-st.
72. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 40, 96, 111.
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should be made mandatory in all jurisdictions, not only for new-
comers, but also for veteran criminal investigators, prosecutors,
and trial judges.
E. Eligibility Factors for the Death Penalty
Illinois is divided into 102 counties, each of which has a state's
attorney, who is elected every four years. The death penalty may
be imposed only on those convicted of a homicide which involved
one or more of the twenty-one statutory "eligibility factors"-the
circumstances of the homicide that expose the defendant to a po-
tential death sentence. Historically, each state's attorney decided
in which cases to seek the death penalty from among the "death
eligible" cases.
A majority of the governor's commission recommended that the
number of eligibility factors be reduced from twenty-one to five; a
minority recommended reduction to six, with retention of the fel-
ony-murder factor.73 The General Assembly made changes in the
language of several of the factors, but did not substantively
change the eligibility factors."
In Part II.B above, I have included statistics showing the large
number of cases resolved in Illinois during 2006 that prosecutors
initially certified for capital punishment, compared to the few
that resulted in death sentences, by a margin of over twenty to
one.7" Legislatures should consider narrowing the classes of eligi-
bility factors, to assure that only the "worst of the worst" homi-
cide cases may be designated by prosecutors for ultimate pun-
ishment.
F. Proportionality of Illinois Capital Prosecutions-Race and
Locality
Experts retained by the governor's commission conducted a
statistical study of Illinois capital cases from 1988 to 1997 and
concluded that there existed significant evidence of bias-also
known as a lack of proportionality-in the way in which the capi-
73. See id. at 67-68, 73-75.
74. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West Supp. 2006).
75. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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tal punishment system operated in Illinois.76 According to the
study, the bias manifested itself in two respects: capital punish-
ment was sought more often and imposed in death eligible cases
(1) when the victims were white, and (2) when the cases were
prosecuted in rural rather than urban counties.77
To attempt to eliminate these biases, and to achieve greater
statewide proportionality, the governor's commission made a
number of interrelated recommendations.
First, the trial court should record this data about all Illinois
first degree murder cases, regardless of whether or not the death
penalty was sought or imposed, and the Administrative Office of
Illinois Courts should keep this information.7" This recommenda-
tion was not adopted by either the General Assembly or the Illi-
nois Supreme Court.
Second, the Illinois Attorney General and Illinois State's At-
torneys Association should "adopt recommendations as to the pro-
cedures State's Attorneys should follow in deciding whether or
not to seek the death penalty," with the qualification that "these
recommendations should not have the force of law, or be imposed
by court rule or legislation."79 The Illinois General Assembly en-
acted a statute which provides, "The Attorney General and
State's Attorneys Association shall consult on voluntary guide-
lines for procedures governing whether or not to seek the death
penalty. The guidelines do not have the force of law and are only
advisory in nature." ° As noted below, these guidelines have been
adopted.
Third, the General Assembly or the Governor should establish
a five member state-wide review panel, made up of experienced
judges and lawyers, to review death penalty certification.8 ' The
review panel should have the power to revoke the certification if a
majority of panel members concludes that the case does not war-
rant capital punishment.8 2 The Illinois State's Attorneys Associa-
tion opposed this proposal on the ground that it impinges on each
76. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 195-97.
77. See id. at 196.
78. Id. at 189.
79. Id. at 82.
80. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(k) (West Supp. 2006).
81. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 84.
82. See id. at 85.
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elected state's attorney's exclusive power to determine whether or
not the death penalty will be sought.8 3 Neither the General As-
sembly nor the Governor has adopted this recommendation.
Fourth, when a jury convicts and sentences a defendant to
death, the trial judge should be given power to override the jury's
imposition of capital punishment, and impose a life sentence."'
The General Assembly did not adopt this recommendation.
Fifth, after reviewing each case in which capital punishment
has been imposed, the Supreme Court of Illinois should conduct a
"proportionality review" of the sentence, considering, among other
factors, "whether the sentence of death was excessive or dispro-
portionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases." 5 Instead of
adopting this proposal, the General Assembly inserted a provision
into the criminal code that the supreme court may overturn a
death sentence and order imprisonment "if the court finds that
the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the par-
ticular case.""6
Thus, only one of the commission's five proposals aimed at
achieving a degree of uniformity in the Illinois capital punish-
ment system has been adopted, which is merely advisory. To their
credit, the Illinois Attorney General and the Illinois State's At-
torneys Association adopted "Death Penalty Decision Guidelines,"
which are voluntary and "do not have the force of law, but.., are
intended to assist State's Attorneys in exercising their discretion
in conformance with the highest standards of justice."" The
guidelines, which are listed below, embody an excellent summary
of factors state's attorneys should consider in deciding whether to
pursue capital punishment "for the most heinous murders."88
(1) The strength of the State's case, which should convince the
prosecutor to "have absolutely no doubt regarding the defendant's
guilt" and to be "confident in the quality of the evidence and its
83. While I disagree with the association's position, this is not an appropriate place
for rebuttal.
84. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 152.
85. Id. at 166.
86. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(i) (West Supp. 2006).
87. OFFICE OF THE ILL. Arr'Y GEN. & ILL. STATE'S Arr'Ys ASS'N, DEATH PENALTY
DECISION GUIDELINES 2 (2006).
88. Id.
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ability to meet, and even surpass, the burden of proof of beyond a
reasonable doubt."
8 9
(2) The accumulation of all available material and relevant evi-
dence and "whether additional evidence is necessary in order to
reasonably assure that a conviction may be obtained."9"
(3) The nature of the offense, resisting "the temptation or pub-
lic pressure to seek a death sentence solely on the basis of the
brutality of the crime without reference to other relevant fac-
tors."9 1
(4) The views of the victim's family.92
(5) The views of other experienced prosecutors. 93
(6) The views of defense counsel, who should be "presented a
fair opportunity to present valid reasons why the death penalty
should not be sought."94
While these guidelines are an admirable statement of general
principles, they will only have whatever effect each of the 102
state's attorneys chooses to give them. The discussion in Part II
above, which shows how almost all of the death-certified cases re-
solved in 2006 resulted in a sentence of a term of years,9" under-
lines the need for these guidelines. But because they are merely
precatory, the Illinois General Assembly should consider adoption
of the other four commission recommendations listed above.
G. Duties of Police and Prosecutors to Disclose Information
The governor's commission recommended that police officers
provide prosecutors with all investigatory materials, including
exculpatory evidence.96 The Illinois Legislature adopted this pro-
posal and made it applicable to all felonies.97 The legislature also
enacted a statute recommended by the commission, which re-
89. Id. at 2, 4.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 8-9.
93. Id. at 7-8.
94. Id. at 9.
95. See supra Part II.B.
96. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 22.
97. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/114-13(b) (West 2006).
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quires prosecutors in a capital case to inform defense lawyers of
any benefits promised or given to State witnesses.9" Thus far, I
have not learned of any problems arising from compliance with
these requirements.
Prior to the issuance of the governor's commission report, the
Illinois Supreme Court adopted Rule 412, 99 which requires prose-
cutors to provide relevant evidence to defense counsel,' °° and
Rule 416(e),"° ' which provides that the trial court may authorize
discovery depositions in capital cases.' 2 The court has thus far
failed to address two other recommendations of the governor's
commission: to define the kinds of exculpatory evidence prosecu-
tors must give the defense before trial, and to adopt a rule explic-
itly embodying prosecutors' continuing postconviction duty to dis-
close exculpatory evidence. 0 3
H. Pretrial Hearings Regarding Jailhouse Informants
Adopting one of the governor's commission's major recommen-
dations,' 4 the Illinois General Assembly enacted a statute-the
first of its kind, so far as I am aware-applicable to capital cases
in which the State intends to offer the testimony of a jailhouse in-
formant ("snitch"). The statute requires the trial judge to hold a
pretrial hearing with the burden on the State to prove, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the testimony is reliable.' 5 Only
after meeting this burden will the evidence be admissible at
trial. 106
I am aware of only one capital trial in which a pretrial hearing
was held pursuant to this new statute. 07 It is my hope that the
absence of other pretrial hearings reflects a growing recognition
among prosecutors of the dangers inherent in this class of testi-
98. Id. 5/115-22.
99. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412.
100. Id.
101. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 416(e).
102. Id.
103. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 119-20, 168-69.
104. See id. at 122-23.
105. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-21 (West Supp. 2006).
106. Id.
107. People v. LaGrone, No. 03CF101 (Ill., DeWitt County) (on file with author); see E-
mail from Jeffrey M. Howard, Capital Case Coordinator, Cook County Pub. Defender, to
author (Feb. 2, 2007) (on file with author).
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mony, which has played a part in far too many convictions of per-
sons later shown to be innocent.' 08
I. Certification and Training of Trial Judges and Lawyers
Judges. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 43 provides that judges
who preside over capital cases shall attend a capital litigation
seminar at least once every two years. 109 The governor's commis-
sion recommended the supreme court should specifically require
that: (1) before trial court judges preside over capital trials, they
complete capital litigation training, including training as to rules
with respect to management of the discovery process, and (2)
capital cases be tried only by judges who are certified as qualified
to hear capital cases based on completion of specialized training
and experience in hearing criminal cases. 10 In past years, reports
were received that some judges in rural counties were not prop-
erly prepared to handle the complexities of capital cases. It ap-
pears corrective steps have been taken, and judges now assigned
to try capital cases have the requisite knowledge and experience.
The responsibilities of the trial judge in capital cases include
handling ex parte defense applications for legal fees, expert wit-
nesses, and other expenses, payable from the Capital Litigation
Trust Fund ("CLTF"). In some cases, these expenses can add up
to sizeable sums. In one notorious case, the trial judge approved a
defense lawyer's charges in excess of $1 million. The judge ex-
plained that he had no discretion under the relevant statute to
review or reduce the amounts requested."' This led the General
Assembly to explicitly provide that the trial judge has authority
to impose budgets on defense counsel and to reduce or decline re-
quests for payments from the CLTF. "'
Trial lawyers. An Illinois Supreme Court Rule requires that
lead and co-counsel in capital cases be certified members of the
Illinois Capital Litigation Trial Bar ("CLTB").113 In order to main-
108. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 7-9. It seems illogical not to ex-
tend this pretrial hearing requirement to all felonies.
109. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 43.
110. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 94-101.
111. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/10(b), (d) (West 2002).
112. See id. (a)(1), (d) (West Supp. 2006).
113. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 701(b).
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tain their certification, members of the CLTB must attend regu-
larly provided mandatory training seminars.' 14
Prosecutors. There has been no lack of qualified prosecutors
available to try capital cases. The Illinois Attorney General's Of-
fice and the Office of the State Appellate Prosecutor assist local
state's attorneys by providing the services of experienced mem-
bers of the CLTB to take the lead or assist in capital prosecutions.
Defense lawyers. Public defender offices in Cook County and
many other populous downstate counties employ experienced,
talented trial lawyers on a full or part-time basis. However, when
homicide cases are certified for capital punishment in counties
that have no public defender, difficulties have arisen in locating
lawyers who are CLTB members and are willing to act as defense
counsel. The Office of the State Appellate Defender has alleviated
this problem in rural communities by providing CLTB-certified
trial lawyers to assist in capital trials.
J. Jury Instructions During the Guilt-Innocence Phase
Three significant recommendations of the governor's commis-
sion relate to jury instructions. Recommendation fifty-six con-
cerns factors for juries to consider with respect to eyewitness tes-
timony, including the difficulties of making cross-racial
identifications.115 Recommendation fifty-seven cautions about the
reliability of the testimony of in-custody informants. 1 6 Recom-
mendation fifty-eight advocates the superior reliability of elec-
tronic recordings that contain the defendant's actual voice or
statements written by the defendant, as compared to a non-
recorded summary." 7
For over two years I have unsuccessfully attempted to per-
suade the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction Committee (Criminal)
to consider making these three jury instructions applicable to all
felonies.' I have been told, however, that the committee will
114. Id. at 714.
115. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 129.
116. Id. at 131.
117. Id. at 133.
118. Memorandum from Thomas P. Sullivan to the Justices of the Ill. Supreme Court
and the Court's Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Mar. 7, 2005)
(on file with author).
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prepare pattern instructions only on subjects or rules that are
codified in Illinois legislation or rulings of the Illinois courts.11 9 I
pointed out, but to no avail, that no limitation of this sort was
placed on our work when I was a member of the original IPI-
Criminal Committee in the 1960s. Also, a number of the instruc-
tions contained in the committee's current bound book of pattern
instructions deal with subjects that are not supported by legisla-
tion or court opinions.
This is where the matter stands today, almost five years after
the members of the governor's commission made these recom-
mendations, despite the critical importance of jury instructions of
these subjects, and adoption of cautionary instructions in other
states. 120
K. Practices During the Eligibility and Sentencing Phases
The Illinois General Assembly adopted two of the governor's
commission's recommendations relating to the sentencing phase
of capital cases, namely, the judge or jury should consider evi-
dence of the defendant's history of emotional or physical abuse or
reduced mental capacity when deciding whether to impose the
death penalty.12 ' The legislature also adopted the recommenda-
tion that capital punishment may not be imposed if the only evi-
119. See, e.g., Michael P. Toomin, Capital Punishment Reform and the Illinois Supreme
Court: At the Forefront of Change, 92 ILL. B.J. 642, 646 (2004).
120. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127a(b) (West 2004) (at the request of parties to a
criminal trial, the court must give a jury instruction providing that "testimony of an in-
custody informant should be viewed with caution and close scrutiny"); N.J. SUP. CT. R.
3:17(d) (the failure to electronically record a defendant's custodial interrogation must be a
factor for consideration by the jury in determining whether the statement was made and
what weight the statement should have); United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 847 (9th
Cir. 1996) (commenting that the court gave a comprehensive four-page jury instruction
that the jurors should consider in their evaluation of eyewitness testimony); Common-
wealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533-34 (Mass. 2004) (noting that defendant is
entitled to instruction informing the jury to view a defendant's alleged statement that was
not recorded by the police with great care and caution); State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093,
1102-03 (R.I. 2004) (commenting that the trial court was careful to address the issues
about eyewitness identification during jury instructions); State v. Hubbard, 48 P.3d 953,
960-61 (Utah 2002) (accepting jury instructions that educate the jurors by providing and
explaining the factors that affect the accuracy of identifications).
121. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(c)(6)-(7) (West 2006); GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra
note 1, at 141. See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that Eighth
Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" clause prohibits executions of mentally re-
tarded defendants).
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dence of guilt is uncorroborated testimony of a jailhouse infor-
mant, a single eyewitness, or an accomplice.'22
Two other recommendations have not been enacted: (1) the de-
fendant should have the right to make a statement on his own
behalf during the sentencing phase without being subject to
cross-examination,'23 and (2) the jury should be instructed as to
alternative sentences in the event they do not impose the death
penalty. 124 At present, the jury is instructed on alternative sen-
tences only when the alternative is a sentence of natural life, thus
providing sentencing juries with the same information trial
judges have when they impose sentences.' 25 Again, future legisla-
tive consideration is appropriate.
L. Scope of Illinois Supreme Court's Review of Capital Sentences
In Illinois, capital cases are appealed directly to the Illinois
Supreme Court. 126 A majority of the governor's commission rec-
ommended that the court should consider, among other factors,
"whether the sentence of death was excessive or disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases." 127 This is known as "pro-
portionality review." The commission proposed that the Illinois
Supreme Court be granted explicit authority to conduct this
broad comparative analysis in order to ensure consistency and
fairness in the statewide application of the death penalty.12 This
is especially pertinent in light of the commission's experts' find-
ings of bias in the imposition of the death penalty, which they
found to be imposed more frequently in rural areas and when the
victim is white. 129 The commission also recommended using sta-
tistics collected at the trial court level about all indicted homicide
cases to assist the supreme court in ensuring consistency and
fairness. 130
122. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(h-5) (West Supp. 2006); GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra
note 1, at 158.
123. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 142.
124. Id. at 144-45 (adopted by a majority).
125. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), No. 7C.05.
126. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(i) (West 2002).
127. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 166.
128. Id. at 167-68.
129. Id. at 196.
130. Id. at 189.
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While these two recommendations do not require legislative ac-
tion, as the Illinois Supreme Court may adopt both proposals un-
der its general supervisory and rulemaking powers, 13' neither the
court nor the legislature has acted on either recommendation. In-
stead, as noted above, 132 the General Assembly adopted a provi-
sion authorizing the supreme court to overturn a death sentence
and order imprisonment "if the court finds that the death sen-
tence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular
case."
133
In People v. Mertz, decided in 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's argument that the court should imple-
ment a proportionality comparison in order to ensure that the
imposition of the death penalty is procedurally fair.13 ' The court
explained that it had "repeatedly rejected arguments for propor-
tionality comparisons in unrelated cases, capital or otherwise."
135
The court adhered to the view that "each capital case 'is unique
and must be evaluated on its own facts." 36 In reaching this deci-
sion, the court also noted that the General Assembly did not
adopt the commission's proposal recommending proportionality
evaluations in capital cases. 131
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court evaluates the fairness of a
death sentence only by determining whether it "is fundamentally
unjust as applied to the particular case." 13' This decision might
have an effect in cases in which the co-defendant is not sentenced
131. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
132. See supra Part III.F.
133. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(i) (West Supp. 2006).
134. People v, Mertz, 842 N.E.2d 618, 668-69 (Ill. 2005).
135. Id. at 669.
136. Id. (quoting People v. Ballard, 794 N.E.2d 788, 807 (Ill. 2002)).
137. Id.; see also People v. Thompson, 853 N.E.2d 378, 404-05 (Ill. 2006) ("[C]ompar-
ative proportionality review in death penalty cases is not required by the United States
Constitution, and it is not a feature of the capital sentencing process under the Illinois
Constitution.") (footnote omitted).
138. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(i) (West 2006). Art. I, § 11 of the Illinois Constitu-
tion provides, in part, that "[aill penalties shall be determined both according to the seri-
ousness of the offense ... ." The Illinois Supreme Court has held this provision encom-
passes challenges to sentences on the ground that they are "cruel, degrading, or so wholly
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community."
People v. McCarty, 858 N.E.2d 15, 33 (Ill. 2006). In People v. Szabo, 447 N.E.2d 193, 205
(Ill. 1983), the Illinois Supreme Court said, "this court has a duty to ensure that the cases
in which death is imposed are rationally distinguished from those in which it is not im-
posed. [citations omitted] Rationally, consistency, and evenhandedness in the imposition
of the death penalty are constitutionally indispensable [citations omitted]."
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to death, but it appears not to have an effect in cases involving a
single capital defendant.
In my view, it is the responsibility of the Illinois General As-
sembly to address the findings that racial and geographic dis-
crimination exist in the Illinois capital punishment system.
139 If
the General Assembly fails to do so, the Illinois Supreme Court
should use its supervisory powers over the Illinois judicial system
to make arrangements for the accumulation of relevant statistics
and to review the proportionality of each capital case presented to
it. 14
0
M. Independent State Forensic Laboratory and Processing and
Testing of DNA Samples
The forensic laboratories, operated by the Illinois State Police
Department, have the responsibility for processing and testing
DNA samples in criminal cases in three areas: (1) testing DNA in
cases that are in the investigative stages prior to trial; 1 ' (2) proc-
essing of DNA samples of persons convicted of felonies for inclu-
sion in the federal Combined DNA Index System, known as
"CODIS;"142 and (3) testing DNA samples of convicted persons
when the court orders forensic testing-including DNA compari-
sons-upon a showing that specific forensic evidence was not sub-
ject to testing at the time of trial. 143
139. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 196.
140. In the legislation establishing the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee,
the General Assembly directed the Committee to "study the impact of the various reforms
to the capital punishment system enacted by the 93rd General Assembly and annually
report to the General Assembly on the effect of these reforms." 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
3929/2(b) (West Supp. 2006). These reports shall include, among others points:
The impact of the reforms on the issue of uniformity and proportionality in
the application of the death penalty including, but not limited to, the tracking
of data related to whether the reforms have eliminated the statistically sig-
nificant differences in sentencing related to the geographic location of the
homicide and the race of the victim found by the Governor's Commission on
Capital Punishment in its report issued on April 15, 2002.
Id.
141. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5 (West Supp. 2006).
142. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3(F) (West Supp. 2006); see also ILLINOIS
STATE POLICE, 2005 DNA TESTING ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 8, http://www.isp.state.il.us/
docs/6-684.pdf.
143. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (West Supp. 2006). To make a motion under
section 116-3, the defendant must make a prima facie case that identity was at issue in
the underlying trial, that the forensic evidence has not been compromised, and that the
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A majority of the governor's commission recommended that an
independent state forensic laboratory be created."' This labora-
tory would be operated by civilian personnel, with its own budget,
separate from any police agency or supervision, rather than as a
division of the Illinois State Police Department.'45 The recom-
mendation was based on the belief that the overall quality of fo-
rensic services would be improved if the lab were truly independ-
ent, and because it is crucial that the public have confidence in
the integrity of the state's forensic work. 146 This proposal was not
adopted, and so the Illinois forensic laboratories have continued
operation as a division of the Illinois State Police Department.
The commission also recommended that the General Assembly
provide adequate funding to hire and train forensic scientists to
support expansion of DNA testing and evaluation and to purchase
additional up-to-date facilities for DNA testing.'47
The General Assembly has created the Illinois Laboratory Ad-
visory Committee ("ILAC"),"' the mandate of which includes: ex-
amining ways to make more efficient use of state laboratories;'49
examining ways to reduce lab backlogs;5 0 making recommenda-
tions to ensure resources allow for accurate, timely and complete
analysis of all samples submitted for testing;' 5 and making rec-
ommendations to ensure quality assurance of private laboratory
testing within the state. 52 The General Assembly also enacted a
statute requiring the Illinois State Police Department to report to
the governor and the General Assembly "the extent of the backlog
of cases awaiting testing or awaiting DNA analysis."153
State-operated forensic labs have been beset with problems
that have had a substantial negative impact on DNA testing. As
of February 2007, the Illinois State Police Department had filed
results of the testing have the potential to produce relevant evidence. Id. The results need
not completely exonerate the defendant, however. Id.; see also GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra
note 1 at 58-60.
144. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 52-53.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 183.
148. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3981/5(a) (West Supp. 2006).
149. Id. at (j)(8).
150. Id. at (j)(9).
151. Id. at (j)(5).
152. Id. at (j)(6).
153. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3a (West 2006).
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its report for 2005 but not 2006.154 At the end of 2005, the DNA
processing backlog (in excess of thirty days) was extremely high,
consisting of 3063 samples at year end, owing in part to a discov-
ery that hundreds of DNA samples had been mistakenly analyzed
by a private firm to which the samples had been "outsourced" for
testing.155 To make matters worse, the ILAC has reported that
the labs have serious problems in hiring qualified personnel, es-
pecially at the supervisory level, owing in substantial part to the
salary structure. 1
56
As the Illinois Legislature and Executive attempt to remedy
these problems, I suggest they revisit the governor's commission's
proposal-which is being replicated in many other states-that
the labs be removed from state police control to an independent
government agency.
N. The Cost of Illinois Capital Cases
As noted at the outset of this article, in the four years since
Governor Ryan emptied Illinois's death row in January 2003, ten
men have been convicted of murder and sentenced to death,
which computes to an average of between two and three capital
sentences per year. What has this system cost?
In money terms, year in and year out, Illinois's capital punish-
ment system comes with a major price tag. The Illinois General
Assembly has established the Capital Litigation Trust Fund to
provide funds for the prosecution and defense of capital homicide
cases.'57 The statistics provided by the Illinois State Comptroller
summarizing the CLTF expenses for the years 2003 through 2006
show a total of $53.6 million spent for expenses connected to tri-
als, appeals and other postconviction proceedings of capital
cases. 55 For the four-year period between 2003 and 2006, this
represents an average of $13.5 million per year. It must be kept
154. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, supra note 142, at 8. Owing to a 2006 change in statute,
the next ISP report on the status of DNA testing is not due until August 1, 2007. 730 ILCS
5/5-4-3a.
155. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, supra note 142, at 5, 8.
156. See ILLINOIS LABORATORY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 2006 REPORT 3 (on file with au-
thor).
157. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/15 (West 2002).
158. E-mail and attached cost information sheets from Illinois Comptroller's Office
(Feb. 13, 2007, 14:15 CST) (on file with author).
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in mind that these figures include costs arising from capital cases
in which the death penalty was not imposed, either because the
defendant was acquitted, a sentence other than death was given,
the prosecutor withdrew capital certification, or the certified case
is still pending. On the other side of the ledger, the figures do not
take into account the cost of police investigations and time spent
preparing for and attending trials, nor the salaries of the lawyers
from the attorney general's office or the appellate prosecutor's of-
fice, nor many postconviction costs associated with the lengthy
court and clemency appeals routinely made by defendants sen-
tenced to death.
If the past is a guide to the future, almost all pending certified
cases (over 150 as of December 31, 2006)159 will be de-certified
and resolved as non-capital. 6 ° I do not have available the cost of
non-capital homicide cases from beginning to end, including the
cost of imprisonment,16' but I believe the money spent on capital
cases is significantly disproportionate to the cost of processing
homicide cases in which state's attorney does not certify the case
for the death penalty. 162
There have been unproven allegations that some state's attor-
neys outside Cook County have certified homicides as capital in
order to tap into CLTF funds to avoid paying the costs from the
local county budget. Before trial, the death certification is then
removed-known as "de-deathed"-to avoid going through the
three stage capital trial process in cases in which prosecutors did
not intend to seek death in the first place. There have also been
unproven allegations that some state's attorneys certify cases for
the death penalty in order to bring pressure on the defendant-
159. IACDP REPORT, supra note 16, at 31-35.
160. See supra Part II.B.
161. Exact numbers are not available. The governor's commission did not fund a cost
study because a majority of the members believed that cost was outside the scope of the
commission's charter. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 11, 198.
162. Studies in other states have repeatedly shown that the cost of capital cases, from
indictment through the postconviction process to execution, exceeds by a substantial mar-
gin the cost of cases successfully prosecuted as non-capital cases, from indictment to im-
prisonment to the end of the postconviction process. See id.; cf LEGISLATIVE DIV. OF POST
AUDIT OF THE STATE OF KAN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT: COSTS INCURRED FOR DEATH
PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 11-12 (2003),
http://www.kslegislature.org/postaudit/audits-perform/04paO3a.pdf (estimating that cases
in which the death sentence was sought and imposed cost about 70% more than murder
cases that could have been but were not charged as capital).
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who faces the risk that if the case is tried it will result in death-
to plead guilty and negotiate a life sentence or term of years. 16 3
As noted above in Part III.F and Part III.K, 6 4 the capital pun-
ishment system in Illinois lacks any overall, statewide system in
place to assure consistency in capital certifications or to protect
against the racial and geographic bias reported by the governor's
commission. Nor is there any control to prevent capital certifica-
tions in the many first degree murder cases in which the facts are
unlikely to lead to the imposition of the death penalty.
Capital cases in Illinois take far longer to resolve than those
that do not involve the death penalty. The few cases in which the
death penalty is imposed in Illinois are treated far differently by
all participants in the process. As noted, each capital case has the
potential for three separate trials: first, whether or not the defen-
dant is guilty or innocent; second, if guilty, whether he/she is eli-
gible for capital punishment; and third, if eligible, whether capi-
tal punishment should be imposed. Then follows years of review,
in both state and federal courts, often requiring retrials. Then fol-
low petitions for executive clemency.
Before the Illinois moratorium took effect in 2000, it was re-
ported that the average time from sentence of death to execution
was in excess of a dozen years, reflecting the frequency with
which death cases are reversed on appeal, requiring re-trials of
the guilt-innocence phase, or re-hearings of the eligibility or pun-
ishment phase. 165
While the Illinois Supreme Court declines to review death
cases for proportionality, it examines death penalty cases at
length for trial errors, "subjecting the record to intense scrutiny
to ensure that only those deserving of the ultimate penalty are so
sentenced."'66 Take, for example, the capital cases heard and af-
firmed by the Illinois Supreme Court since January 2003:
163. See, e.g., Adam Kovac, Barsanti's Strategy of Using the Death Penalty to Leverage
Plea Bargains Has Met With Mixed Results-and Some Criticism, CHI. DAILY HERALD,
July 18, 2006, at 1.
164. See supra Parts III.F., III.K.
165. See E-mail with attached data from Executive Director, Center on Wrongful Con-
victions, Northwestern University School of Law, to Jenner & Block (Mar. 30, 2007, 11:57
CST) (on file with author).
166. People v. Thompson, 853 N.E.2d 378, 397-98 (Ill. 2006).
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* In January 2005, the supreme court affirmed the death sen-
tence imposed on Anthony Mertz for a murder that occurred in
2001 (97 pages in Illinois Reports). 16 7
* In April 2006 the court affirmed the death sentence against
Curtis Thompson for a 2002 murder (59 pages). 168
* Cecil Sutherland was initially indicted in 1988 for a murder
that occurred in 1987; he was found guilty and sentenced to death
in 1989.169 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the verdict and
sentence in 1992,17' and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in 1993.171 The state court denied a postconviction peti-
tion, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed that ruling in 2000
for ineffective assistance of counsel and improper prosecutorial
argument. 172 The case was retried in 2004, and Sutherland was
again found guilty and sentenced to death. The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed in 2006 (92 pages). 173
* In February 2007, the court affirmed the Ricardo Harris
death sentence for a 1999 murder (40 pages)'74 and the Urdiales
decision involving a 1996 murder (78 pages). 175
Capital cases take a toll on the state's finances and the prose-
cutors and defense lawyers involved, and require an extraordi-
nary amount of time and attention by the courts. But all of this
pales in comparison to the psychological and often the financial
injuries inflicted on victims' families, who are often required to
come back to court to face again the once convicted perpetrator,
and to rethink and re-testify about the most horrible experience
in their lives. Often overlooked is the impact on condemned de-
fendants' innocent family members, as well as the mental and
physical devastation suffered by those mistakenly convicted and
sentenced to death and later released from prison, which in Illi-
nois in recent years exceeded ten percent of those given capital
punishment.
167. People v. Mertz, 842 N.E.2d 618, 622-23, 671 (Ill. 2005).
168. Thompson, 853 N.E.2d at 381-82,409.
169. People v. Sutherland, 742 N.E.2d 306, 307-08 (Ill. 2000).
170. People v. Sutherland, 610 N.E.2d 1, 14 (Ill. 1992).
171. Sutherland v. Illinois, 510 U.S. 858 (1993).
172. Sutherland, 742 N.E.2d at 307, 312.
173. People v. Sutherland, 860 N.E.2d 178, 191, 240 (Ill. 2006).
174. People v. Harris, No. 98942, 2007 WL 289507, at *1, *27 (Ill. Feb. 1, 2007).
175. People v. Urdiales, No. 98996, 2007 WL 495282, at *2, *56 (Ill. Feb. 16, 2007).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of the current state of capital punish-
ment reform in Illinois does not capture all of the nuances, the
push and shove, or the costs-both human and financial-of capi-
tal cases litigated in Illinois since the governor commuted all of
the death sentences in January 2003. But it will serve to illus-
trate some of the advances made, some still to be achieved, and
some detriments to the Illinois system.
In Illinois, capital cases amount to less than two percent of all
felony prosecutions. The reforms adopted by the Illinois General
Assembly have for the most part been limited to those relatively
few cases that are certified as capital. Yet a great many have
equal application to the vast majority of non-capital felony cases,
including homicides that are not certified or are not "death eligi-
ble," in which defendants face the prospect of lengthy jail terms,
often for life. It is an unfortunate fact that the capital punish-
ment system inevitably diverts attention from efforts to reform
the criminal justice system as a whole to focusing only on reform-
ing homicide cases a state's attorney certifies. It is for that reason
that I believe the single most important recommendation of the
governor's commission was number eighty-three, which has noth-
ing to do with capital cases and which has largely been ignored:
"The Commission strongly urges consideration of ways to broaden
the application of many of the recommendations made by the
Commission to improve the criminal justice system as a whole."176
These considerations have caused me to conclude that the costs
of the Illinois capital punishment system-for example, the
money spent, the years of controversy entailed, the impact of fre-
quent re-trials on victims' families, the haphazard, inconsistent
ways in which a fraction of homicides cases eventually end with
death sentences, the time lapse from judgments to executions, the
irreversible risk of errors, and the distracting effect on efforts to
reform the entire system-are not justified by whatever the sys-
tem is intended to achieve.
176. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 187.
[Vol. 41:935
